This paper provides a unique opportunity to observe how a public policy affected the earnings of various interest groups at different stages of implementation. Specifically, we examine how the earnings of women, union members, and supervisory and professional staff were affected by various proposed and implemented comparable worth pay plans in Iowa. We find that large relative gains to women in the original proposed plans were reduced as the process evolved. As a result, some of the original gains to women were redistributed to union members, supervisors, and professionals.
Despite 25 years of legislation related to equal pay, equal opportunity, and affirmative action for women in the job market, women still tend to be concentrated in relatively low-paying, predominantly female jobs. This perceived lack of rapid progress in women's labor market status has motivated some states and localities to consider or implement comparable worth as an additional weapon in the battle against sex discrimination. Supporters view comparable worth as a method for achieving immediate increases in the pay for female-dominated jobs, given the apparent ineffectiveness of previous legislation in raising the pay of women relative to that of men.
A typical comparable worth policy calls for a study of jobs and pay structure within an organization to determine if there has been any We would like to thank the Panel on Pay Equity, National Research Council, for partial support in funding this study and members of the state government of Iowa for their cooperation in providing data and information relevant to the comparable worth process. Jeff Greig and Kyle Stephens provided able research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are exclusively those of the authors.
A fundamental problem with such plans is that the valuation of different jobs is inherently subjective, meaning that two equally informed, unbiased, and qualified analysts could value the same job very differently. The problem becomes more difficult as more and more agents with differing agendas are brought into the analysis.
Because comparable worth pay analysis in the public sector has typically been conducted with input from various combinations of consultants, politicians, women's groups, union representatives, supervisory staff, and rank-and-file employees, it is clear that the results can be influenced by the objectives of the individuals or constituent groups involved in the process. The process becomes even more subject to external pressure when decisions are made regarding implementation of the plan. Public-sector budget constraints, market opportunities for public-sector employees, and union resistance to pay cuts may significantly alter the pay plan relative to the initial proposal. This paper illustrates how the original goals of a comparable worth policy can become diluted as political and economic pressures from state budgets, politicians, unions, personnel professionals, market forces, and supervisory personnel enter the implementation process.
We make use of a unique data set from the state of Iowa that allows us to examine the earnings structure underlying the initial pay plan, a consultant's initial proposed plan, a plan designed by a steering committee composed of politicians, a compromise plan implemented after negotiations between the state and the union, and the final plan that resulted after an appeals process was completed. We are able to show how the returns to women, union members, supervisors, and professionals changed under successive pay plans. The results indicate that initial gains to women were ultimately reduced and redirected toward constituencies that stood to lose or gain little as a result of the initial plan: union members, professionals, supervisors, and those with the highest market wages.
In the next section, we discuss the process of legislating and implementing comparable worth in the state of Iowa. After a discussion of our data and methodology, we present our empirical analysis. We conclude with a summary of our results and an evaluation of whether these results are likely to generalize to other states.
Comparable Worth in Iowa
To date in the United States, comparable worth legislation has been directed only toward government employees at the state or local level.
A recent law in Ontario, Canada, extended coverage to private-sector firms as well. At least seven states completed or have begun to implement comparable worth pay adjustments (Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin), at least two states have completed studies and are deciding whether to implement pay adjustments (Michigan and New Jersey), and several other states are in the process of studying or are considering a study of pay inequities.' In addition, a large number of municipal, county, and school district governing units have initiated comparable worth studies or plans (Ehrenberg and Smith 1987) .
This study focuses on the implementation of comparable worth plans in Iowa. This process started in 1983 when the Iowa legislature voted to fund an initial study of the Iowa Merit Pay System by consultant Arthur Young and Company. A steering committee composed of legislators, administrators, and union representatives voted not to use market wage survey data in the analysis. In cooperation with the consultant, 13 factors (discussed in more detail below) that measured various aspects of skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions were defined. Four-person teams of employees and supervisors assigned points to each factor for each job to which they were assigned.
The teams based their evaluations on employee questionnaires.
Factor weights were obtained using two different methods. First, the Arthur Young consultants derived statistical weights based on the estimated coefficients computed by regressing pay grade on each of the 13 job factors plus a variable that controlled for the percentage female in each job. These estimated weights included several that were statistically insignificant and three that had small negative values.
After examining these regression weights, the steering committee defined a second set, which we refer to as the committee weights.
1 Several states in recent years have developed new state pay plans using factor p count methods but have also incorporated market wage survey information in setting wage rates for key jobs. Although these state plans (such as in Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, and Tennessee) have many features that are similar to comparable worth, they deviate to the extent that market wage rates alter relative pay. The state of Washington also utilized market wage survey information, but we include it in our list of comparable worth states since it has been widely publicized as such and, in particular, because the unions had to sue to obtain implementation of the state's original intent to make such adjustments.
These subjective weights differed in that all were assigned positive values and no factor was given a weight below 5 percent or above 15 percent of the total.
Two sets of total job points (and hence pay grade plans) were generated, one for each set of factor weights. Each recommended plan would have decreased the pay of some job classifications while increasing the pay of other classifications, thereby helping to limit the cost of implementation. The unions, which had been highly supportive up to this point, became resistant when pay cuts became a possibility. From the state's perspective, elimination of the pay cuts would have raised the cost of implementation to an unacceptable level. These issues became part of the contract negotiations between the state and the unions in 1984. The compromise plan settlement was that no one suffer a reduction in pay grade and that the size of all increases be reduced by one pay grade and one step. This plan was implemented (and extended by the governor to noncontract employees) in March 1985.
After implementation, an appeals process was put into effect to hear complaints concerning the comparable worth adjustments. Nonunion appeals were heard by a panel of five personnel professionals, while union appeals were heard by a joint union-management panel. Forty-five percent of the merit system pay recommendations were appealed, with roughly equal proportions receiving increases, decreases, and no change on appeal. The final settlement of a new round of union contract negotiations provided implementation of the recommended pay increase in full in July 1987 but canceled all recommended pay cuts. We estimate that, in total, the final comparable worth system increased annual state payrolls by $26.2 million in 1983 dollars or 8.8 percent of the original payroll.
Methodology and Data
Our objective is to isolate the effect of alternative comparable wo pay plans on the structure of earnings. To do this, we must not a other factors to change that would also alter the pay structure. It would be inaccurate, for example, to compare earnings functions estimated over samples of workers employed before implementation and after implementation. Because the new pay system may cause some employees to quit, others to transfer to different jobs, and stil others to enter state employment, such comparisons of snapshots of the state pay structure at different points in time will be subject to sample selection bias. Second, changes in other exogenous influences over time such as political elections, shifts in public demand for government services, or changes in government revenue could also alter the pay structure. Such coincident influences on employee earnings would render difficult any derivation of the comparative static effects of comparable worth. Finally, our objective is to illustrate how the proposed structure of earnings evolved over time. But not all proposed plans were implemented. Thus we require a methodology that allows us to analyze both earnings structures that were implemented and those that were never adopted.
We resolve these potential problems by holding constant a December 1983 sample of state employees and then observing how their pay would have changed (in 1983 dollars) as a result of each of the proposed or implemented comparable worth plans discussed above. That is, given an individual's 1983 job classification and pay grade, we are able to compute the number of pay grades that his or her job would have increased or decreased given each comparable worth proposal.
Using the December 1983 pay schedule, we then compute what an individual's pay would have been in each case. We compute five different earnings rates for each employee: (1) the actual 1983 earnings, (2) the earnings associated with the recommended Arthur Young plan using the statistical weights, (3) the earnings associated with the recommended steering committee plan using the committee weights, (4) the earnings rate associated with the implemented state/American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) compromise plan, and (5) the earnings rate associated with the implemented state/AFSCME appeals plan. We are therefore able to analyze all plans, whether implemented or not, avoiding biases associated with sample selection or coincident changes in exogenous variables other than comparable worth.
We use the standard earnings function approach pioneered by Mincer (1974) to relate earnings to a set of human capital and individual characteristics according to In Wik ak + bkS1 + CkUz + dkPi + ek In MWi + fkX1 + E k, (1) where In Wik is the natural logarithm of individual i's biweekly earnings under pay plan k, S, is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the incumbent is female, U, is a vector of union status variables, Pi represents dummy variables for professional and supervisory positions, ln MWi is the natural logarithm of the median market wage for the occupation, and Xi is a vector of other human capital and personal characteristics commonly used in earnings functions. These variables are defined more precisely below. The parameters ak, bk, Ck, dk, ek, and fk are specific to pay plan k, and Eik is the error term. These parameters may be compared across pay plans to determine how returns to the various characteristics change across pay plans. In W^k -In W,0 = (ak -ao) + (bk -bo)St + (Ck -co)U,
where the zero subscript represents the original 1983 pay structure.
The estimated coefficients in (2) measure the change in the return to the various characteristics under pay plan k relative to the original 1983 pay plan. A positive coefficient implies that the characteristic "wins" relative to other characteristics as a result of comparable worth, while a negative coefficient means that it "loses." Estimation of (1) and (2) At this level of aggregation, it appears that women did gain as a result of comparable worth. However, economists tend to be more interested in the size of the female-male earnings gap after controlling for human capital and personal characteristics.5 Table 2 5 We exclude the 13 original job factors and the total factor points from the reg sion so as to focus on the pure effect of the personal and human capital varia Variables such as supervisors, education, and experience have corresponding factor that compete to explain the same effects. Also, as we argue in this paper, vario groups such as unions, professionals, and supervisors were able to influence the j factors and the factor-weighting process so that factor points are also a function of union status, professional status, and supervisory status. Thus, e.g., the full imp union status on the pay structure is the direct impact (through negotiation) and indirect effect through potential influence on factor weights and measurements. tests of the sensitivity of our results to other specifications, see Orazem and Ma (1989) .
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regression estimates of equation (1) in which we control for standard measures of education, training, work experience, marital status, and race, as well as the market wage. After controlling for these variables, we see in column 1 that women were underpaid by only 3.9 percent relative to men in 1983. This coefficient is sensitive to inclusion of the market wage variable. When equation (1) is reestimated excluding the market wage, women earned 12 percent less than men.
For our purposes, what is more important is how returns to women change from one pay plan to the next, not the magnitude of the differential. In table 3, we report the estimated ratio of female to male wages both controlling and not controlling for market wages. The highest relative female earnings occur in the statistical plan. However, later revisions and compromises tended to dissipate these gains for women. This general pattern of reductions in the relative gains to women is not altered by the inclusion or exclusion of market wages.
Overall, the results suggest that the implemented plan reduced the unexplained pay gap between men and women by 32-40 percent, whereas the original proposed statistical plan would have virtually eliminated the pay gap.
The Arthur Young Statistical Weight Plan
The original proposed pay plan devised by the Arthur Young consultants weighted the job factors on the basis of coefficients derived from a regression of pay grades on measured job characteristics. Of the four comparable worth plans that we consider, this plan was least subject to political forces. Although based on the same 13 job factors as the other plans, its weights were determined in a "scientific" man- 
The Committee Weights Plan
On receiving the consultants' proposed plan, the steering committee devised its own set of weights. Job factors such as physical demands, working environment, mental/visual demands, unavoidable hazards/ risks, and work pace/pressures and interruptions that had negative or near-zero coefficients in the statistical plan were given positive weights. To the extent that these characteristics were closely associated with blue-collar and clerical jobs, this could be expected to raise the pay of many workers covered by union contract. In fact, the committee explicitly took into account how the factor weights influenced outcomes, including how they affected relative pay for female jobs, in revising the factor weights.6 By setting the weights partly on 6 The Arthur Young report (1984, p. 30) states that "upon reviewing the results of the statistical analysis, the committee determined that the preliminary weights again needed to be refined. The Steering Committee established, as their policy, a final set of weights for each factor. In making their determination they considered the different the basis of their impacts on outcomes, the committee allowed the possibility that favoritism toward a constituency could enter the pay plan.
As seen in table 2, for whatever reasons, the losses that would have been inflicted on unionized workers under the statistical plan were eliminated under the committee plan. The pay difference coefficients (col. 7) show that unionized workers would have made small positive, although insignificant, gains under the committee plan relative to the original 1983 pay plan. At a minimum, the committee plan was neutral toward union jobs.7
In the original Arthur Young study, the job factor most closely associated with supervision (supervision exercised) had a regression coefficient that was essentially equal to the regression coefficients for two other factors (impact of errors and guidelines/supervision available to the workers). The committee plan assigned an 8 percent weight to supervision exercised while leaving the other two factors with 5 percent weights. The committee plan raised supervisors' pay by 3.7 percent relative to the 1983 pay plan. This plan also restored professionals' pay to its original relative level, eliminating a 1.9 percent cut in the statistical plan.
Although it may not have been the committee's objective, the net result of these changes was to greatly reduce the relative gains for women. As opposed to the 8.8 percent gain under the statistical plan, women would have gained only 2.8 percent relative to 1983 pay schedules under the committee plan. One way of interpreting this is that the committee plan shifted the gains toward unions, supervisors, and professionals and away from women. Of course, we should keep in mind that the regression results highlight the relative gains with other variables held constant. In fact, the committee plan raised average pay for both men and women (as seen in table 1). In other words, the committee plan achieved less equalization of pay between men and women than the statistical plan, but at a much higher total cost to the state.
The 1985 Compromise Plan
Neither of these plans was ever implemented. Instead the state and AFSCME negotiated a compromise pay plan. The major compromise impacts on male and female jobs, . . . the statistically derived weights for predicting current grade levels, and the ways the factors actually acted in determining the final point totals for all jobs."
7 Even though the committee plan increased average pay, it reduced the standard deviation of pay across all jobs. This pattern is also typical of the impact of unions on income distributions. See Freeman and Medoff (1984) This relative deemphasis in marginal returns to human capital investment accompanied perhaps by an increase in returns to specific threshold levels of education is likely to occur in other settings. First, because job pay is set in regard to the minimum requirements for successful completion of the job, additional education beyond the minimum is likely to be deemphasized. Second, because the plans are designed to emphasize factors that previously were not being rewarded in the pay structure, the factors that had been given importance in the original pay plan (including tenure, experience, and education) must fall in relative importance.9
Conclusions Our major conclusion is that the ultimate impact of comparable worth Similar though smaller gains were made by professionals and supervisors. Regardless whether we interpret this as a defensive reaction to protect their incumbents from economic loss (Hirsch and Addison 1986) or as rent-seeking activity designed to enhance their income (Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock 1980) , the net impact was to shift gains away from women toward these interest groups. The bottom line is that although women gained, they would have gained much 10 It should be emphasized that the goal of comparable worth is to raise the re pay of female jobs, and, in principle, this may be done without raising the total payroll cost to the state provided that (a) pay is cut in a sufficient number of male-dominated jobs to offset the increases and (b) these jobs remain at or above competitive privatesector rates after the cuts. The latter may be possible given Smith's (1977) analysis. She concluded that federal workers were paid well above, state workers somewhat above, and local-government workers slightly above private-sector workers. An increase in total payroll cost need arise only because of political opposition to pay cuts.
" This discussion relies heavily on telephone interviews with and documentation supplied by individuals who play a key role in their state's comparable worth process. We surveyed the states of Connecticut, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin most intensively since they have the most experience with comparable worth. In addition, Massachusetts has followed a similar pattern, even though its pay plan has taken market wages into account. See the individual state publications listed in the references. assurances to incumbents that they will not be cut at all (in New York)
or not cut for 6 months (in Washington). Very few employees appear to be affected adversely.
All state personnel departments have played an important role in doing the job analysis and setting up the new pay plan. Typically the consultant plays only an advisory role after completing an initial study. In all states, factor ratings were based, in part, on questionnaires filled out by incumbents and, in part, on committees of supervisors and professionals, especially from the personnel departments.
Union representatives were involved in some cases. All states also have provided that appeals of job evaluations may be made, although typically the appeals go back to the same personnel analysts who made the initial decisions.
While each state has its own unique history and political features, the patterns of participation by the major actors (unions, consultants, personnel specialists, legislators, and supervisors) are sufficiently similar to allow the conjecture that our major conclusions apply in other states. That is, we expect that women have gained less than originally proposed as other groups such as unions, supervisors, and professionals protect their interests and capture parts of the gains for themselves. At a minimum, this study has given a unique perspective on how political and economic forces affect the evolution of public policy both in general and in the context of comparable worth.
